We study reflection principles of Peano Arithmetic PA which are based on both proof and provability. Any such reflection principle in PA is equivalent to either ✷P → P (✷P stands for P is provable) or ✷ k u:P → P for some k ≥ 0 (t:P states t is a proof of P ). Reflection principles constitute a non-collapsing hierarchy with respect to their deductive strength u:P → P ≺ ✷u:P → P ≺ ✷ 2 u:P → P ≺ . . . ≺ ✷P → P.
Introduction
Reflection Principles are classical objects in Proof Theory. They were introduced by Rosser [18] and Turing [23] in the 1930s, and later studied by Feferman [8, 9] , Kreisel and Lévi [11] , Schmerl [19] , Artemov [1] , Beklemishev [5, 6] , and many others (cf. survey [4] ).
A proof predicate is a provably decidable formula Proof that enumerates all theorems of PA, PA ⊢ ϕ iff Proof (k, ϕ) for some k.
In this paper all proof predicates are assumed normal ( [3] ), t.e. 1. for every k set T (k) = {ϕ | Proof (k, ϕ)} is finite, the function from k to T (k) is computable;
2. for any k and l there is n such that
Prime example: Gödel's proof predicate.
A natural example of a Reflection Principle is given by so-called local (or implicit) reflection. Let Provable F be ∃xProof (x, F ). In the formal provability setting, the local reflection principle is the set of all arithmetical formulas
where F is an arithmetical formula. Though all the instances of this reflection principle are true in the standard model of Peano Arithmetic PA, some of them are not provable. For example, if F is falsum ⊥, the local reflection principle becomes Gödel's consistency formula
Another example is given by the explicit reflection principle, i.e., the set of formulas Proof (t, F ) → F where t is an arbitrary proof term, and F an arithmetical formula. Here the situation is quite different; all instances of explicit reflection are provable. Indeed, if Proof (t, F ) holds, then F is obviously provable in PA, and so is formula Proof (t, F ) → F . If ¬Proof (t, F ) holds, then it is provable in PA (since ¬Proof (x, y) is decidable) and Proof (t, F ) → F is again provable.
We study (cf. [17] ) reflection principles of Peano Arithmetic PA which are based on both proof and provability predicates. (cf. [3, 7] ).
Let P be a propositional letter and each of Q 1 , Q 2 , . . . , Q m is either '✷' standing for provability in PA, or 'u :' standing for 'u is a proof of . . . in PA', u is a fresh proof variable. Then the formula
is called generator, and the set of all its arithmetical instances is the reflection principle corresponding to this generator. We will refer to reflection principles using their generators.
It is immediate that all reflection principles without explicit proofs (Q i = ✷ for all i) are equivalent to the local reflection principle ✷P → P . All ✷-free reflection principles are provable in PA and hence equivalent to u:P → P . Mixing explicit proofs and provability yields infinitely many new reflection principles:
1. Any reflection principle in PA is equivalent to either ✷P → P or ✷ k u:P → P for some k ≥ 0. 2. Reflection principles constitute a non-collapsing hierarchy with respect to their deductive strength
The proofs essentially rely on introduced by the author Gödel-Löb-Artëmov logic GLA of formal provability and explicit proofs.
Description and basic properties of GLA
We describe the logic GLA introduced in [12] (see also [16] ) in the union of the original languages of Gödel-Löb Logic GL(cf. [7, 21] ) and Artemov's Logic of Proofs LP( [3] ).
The following two systems were predecessors of GLA:
• system B from [2] , which did not have operations on proofs;
• system LPP from [20, 22] in an extension of languages of the logic of formal provability GL and the Logic of Proofs LP.
The immediate successors of GLA are the logic GrzA ( [14] ) of strong provability and explicit proofs and symmetric logic of proofs and provability ( [15] ).
Language of GLA.
Proof terms are built from proof variables x, y, z, . . . and proof constants a, b, c, . . . by means of two binary operations: application '·' and union '+', and one unary proof checker '!'.
Formulas of GLA are defined by the grammar
where t stands for any proof term and S for any sentence letter. Axioms and rules of both Gödel-Löb logic GL and LP, together with three specific principles connecting explicit proofs with formal provability, constitute GLA ∅ .
I. Axioms of classical propositional logic
Standard axioms of the classical logic (e.g., A1-A10 from [10] )
III. Axioms of the Logic of Proofs LP
IV. Axioms connecting explicit and formal provability
A Constant Specification CS for GLA is the set of formulas
where each A i is an axiom of GLA ∅ and each c i is a proof constant.
GLA CS = GLA ∅ + CS, GLA = GLA CS with the "total" CS.
One of the principal properties of GLA is its ability to internalize its own proofs [16] : If GLA ⊢ F , then for some proof term p, GLA ⊢ p:F .
An arithmetical interpretation * of a GLA-formula is the direct sum of corresponding arithmetical interpretations for GL and LP; in particular,
GLA is sound with respect to the arithmetical provability interpretation ( [12, 16] 
):
For any Constant Specification CS and any arithmetical interpretation * respecting CS, if GLA CS ⊢ F then PA ⊢ F * . The following arithmetical completeness theorem holds ( [12, 16] ): For any finite constant specification CS, if GLA CS ⊢ F , then for some interpretation * respecting CS, PA ⊢ F * . In [13, 16] , GLA was supplied with Kripke-style semantics and found to be complete with respect to it.
Reflection principles in Peano Arithmetic
Fix a normal proof predicate Proof and, therefore, the corresponding provability predicate Provable. If F is a GLA-formula, then {F * } denotes the set of all arithmetical interpretations of F based on Proof and Provable.
Definition 1 Let P be a propositional letter and each of Q 1 , Q 2 , . . . , Q m be either ✷ or 'u:' for some fresh proof variable u. Then a formula
* } is a reflection principle corresponding to this generator.
For example, the implicit reflection principle is generated by GLA-formula ✷P → P , the explicit reflection is generated by u:P → P . Definition 2 Let G and H be GLA-formulas. We say that {H * } {G * }, or H G, for short, if PA + {G * } proves all formulas from {H * }. H ≃ G (is read as "H is equivalent to G") means that both H G and G H hold; H ≺ G stands for (H G and H ≃ G).
Example:
u:P → P ≺ ✷P → P.
We study the structure of reflection principles in the explicit-implicit language. In particular, we establish classification of reflection principles (Theorem 4):
Any reflection principle is equivalent to either ✷P → P or, for some k ≥ 0, to ✷ k u:P → P .
We also discover that reflection principles constitute a hierarchy (Theorem 5):
These two results could be immediately concluded from the well-known fact (Lemma 2):
together with the following assertions we will establish in this section:
Uniqueness of Provability Reflection
Let Q 1 Q 2 . . . Q m P → P be a generator, and Q 1 Q 2 . . . Q m consists only of implicit provability operators ✷. It is obvious that the corresponding principle is equivalent to ✷P → P .
Theorem 1 (Uniqueness of Provability Reflection)
Proof. In light of the arithmetic soundness of GLA ∅ ,
follows from the fact that GLA ∅ ⊢ ✷P → ✷ n P . The converse inequality ✷ n P → P ✷P → P is implied by the fact that
is derivable in GLA ∅ . ✷
Leading-Explicit Reflection Principles are provable
Theorem 2 For any n ≥ 0, GLA ∅ ⊢ u:Q 1 Q 2 . . . Q n P → P .
Proof. Induction on n. The base case n = 0 is trivial. For the induction step consider two cases. Case 1 : Q 1 is "v:" for some proof variable v. Then, by explicit reflection,
By the Induction Hypothesis,
Hence
Case 2 : Q 1 is ✷. Then u : Q 1 Q 2 . . . Q n P has type u : ✷ m F for some m ≥ 1, where F is either P or w : Q n−m−1 . . . Q n P . Now we show that
, from 1,2, and 3;
, from 6 and 7; 9. u:✷ m F → F , by Reflection Rule.
If F is P we are done; if F is w : Q n−m−1 . . . Q n P , then, by the Induction Hypothesis, GLA ∅ ⊢ F → P which yields the theorem claim as well. ✷ Corollary 1 (Uniqueness of Leading-Explicit Reflection) Let u:Q 1 Q 2 . . . Q n P → P be a reflection principle generator. Then
Proof. Follows from Theorem 2 by the arithmetical soundness of GLA ∅ . ✷
Classification of Reflection Principles
Theorem 3 Let k ≥ 0 and ✷ k u:Q 1 Q 2 . . . Q n P → P be a reflection principle generator. Then
Proof. The following argument could not be done in GLA; so, we reason in PA instead. First, we establish " ", i.e.,
Fix an interpretation * . By Theorem 1,
We write t:F for Proof (t, F ) and ✷F for Provable F in PA, for brevity. Let s be its proof in PA. Then,
By proof checking and internalized Modus Ponens in PA, we can find an arithmetical proof t such that
from which we conclude
Let us now establish " ", i.e., that
Lemma 1 For each interpretation * there is an interpretation ♯ which coincides with * on P such that
Proof. By induction on n. The case n = 0 is trivial. Let for some interpretation ♭ coinciding with * on P ,
By proof-checking,
, set ♯ to be ♭ everywhere else, and get the desired
Case 2. If Q 1 is ✷, then by reasoning in PA find a proof t such that
which completes theorem's proof. ✷ Now, by the standard PA-reasoning,
and since
and P ♯ = P * we conclude that
✷

From Theorems 1 and 3 immediately follows
Theorem 4 (Classification of Reflection Principles) Any reflection principle is equivalent to either ✷P → P or, for some k ≥ 0, to ✷ k u:P → P.
Proof. Consider and arbitrary reflection principle π
If all Q i are ✷'s, then, by Theorem 1, π = ✷P → P . Otherwise, π can be written as
Hierarchy of Reflection Principles
Theorem 5 Reflection principles form a linear ordering
This Theorem is an immediate corollary of the following two assertions.
Proof. Putting P = ⊥ we get ✷ k u:P → P ¬✷ k ⊥. For the converse, argue in GLA ∅ . Case k = 0 is trivial. Let k ≥ 1. Assume ¬✷ k ⊥, ✷ k u:P , and ¬P and look for a contradiction. By explicit reflection, from ¬P we derive ¬u:P and, by explicit-implicit negative introspection, ✷¬u:P . By transitivity, we get ✷ k ¬u:P . From this and ✷ k u:P , by the usual modal reasoning we conclude ✷ k (¬u:P ∧ u:P ); hence ✷ k ⊥, a contradiction. ✷ Now, to get Theorem 5, it suffices to refer to a well-known fact: 
we have ¬✷ k+1 ⊥ ¬✷ k ⊥, which is impossible, by a). ✷
